Wi-fi security.

Thu Jul 03 04:21:00 -0700 2008
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The whole wi-fi security issue is starting to crop up with increasing regularity in the mainstream media, but there is never any discussion, just warnings of the dangers and warnings of the consequences.

Most home wi-fi boxes offer three levels of "security" under the appropriate tab in the internal web server config page, none, WPA & WEP.

In various other tabs in the internal web server you can set things like channel number and network name, but chances are most of this is way over the head of the average user and they will instead use a set-up wizard and accept whatever defaults it suggests.

My home network consists of a cable modem feeding into a Belkin F5D7231 wireless hub, one cat5 in from the cable modem, and one cat5 out to the Planet DH1600 inside the Sun cabinet.

From the Planet there is cat5 to the streaming mp3 jukebox, to the lan file server, to the RAQ, to the networked colour laser, and one cat5 to the living room "multimedia" PC, and one cable running upstairs.

The Belkin provides wireless access to this laptop, to the girl's computer upstairs, and to the workshop (CNC controller) computer.

Everything in the Sun cabinet I have set up with fixed IP in the 192.168 range, the wireless stuff is DHCP assigned in a different part of the 192.168 range with permanent leases.

The Belkin also provides NAT and DynDNS to the RAQ, and I use OpenDNS nameservers for it.

Security is "none", but the Firewall tab on the internal web server I have MAC address filtering enabled, with the MAC address of every one of the above machines enabled.

From the security perspective I'm not so much worried about anyone stealing my bandwidth, I'd be more concerned about an outsider accessing correspondence or worse still deleting files.

There are two other wireless networks in range of this laptop, one is unsecured with a default name, one is secured with WPA and is called s****snetwork, but Network Stumbler would make easy meat out of either one. Both of them are often powered down.

My method is "picky", it is quite easy to create a set up where (which is actually the situation) one computer (in my case the workshop one) can access the LAN and play streaming mp3's from the LAN and so on, but not access the internet as a whole. In my case this is deliberate, but of course most people want something that they can set up by clicking "OK" a couple of times and everything just works.

I am not sure why, when using the word "security" with wi-fi the default response is "encryption", even though my RAQ is now all https, this is not a security response per se.

The default option when wishing to secure a server is not to encrypt all traffic, the default option is to restrict access.

I am not someone who has vast experience of configuring wi-fi networking, but one feature I have never ever seen on a wi-fi internal web server is a feature that detects all stations in range, and asks if you want to grant each one access, and if so, what type and level of access.

Nor have I ever seen a wi-fi router that flatly refused to function as a wi-fi router until you directly link to it via USB and change settings from factory default, specifically setting an admin password and a workgroup / network name.

This would be a LOT simpler than many of the wizards that do ship.

I was particularly disturbed, a couple of years ago, when I discovered that PCI and PCMCIA wi-fi cards weren't all hard wired, but that most had a small amount of non volatile memory in which settings were saved. I discovered this because I dual boot my laptop between WinXP and Debian, and for the longest time ran a Prism card for debian and a generic one for xp, then one day I discovered that running the windows wireless network setup wizards altered the data in this non volatile memory in such a way that the card would no longer work reliably with linux, and these cards do not come with buttons to reset to factory defaults.

It appears to be the mentality that since THIS is the machine I am using, then the device plugged into THIS machine is the one to run the wizards on, and everything views the whole world of wi-fi from that perspective, instead of the true perspective, which is that all the clients revolve around the AP, the AP is the centre of gravity, not whichever machine I happen to be sat at.

It is this mentality that gives us the broken security model we have, where traffic is encrypted by default, but brute force challenges can simply overcome them, whereas the method I use requires you to brute force spoof every possible MAC address before you can join the network.

I have watched competent coders fiddling with their devices for many minutes trying to get net access in my house, their first recourse is to see if there is a network broadcasting, there is, and their second recourse is to see if they can log on to it, they can't, and their third recourse is to just assume that since their machine didn't log them on automagically, they need a password from me.

This is despite the fact that even the default windows wizards and tools actually give them enough information to indicate that it isn't a password authentication problem, but a more fundamental authentication problem.

I suppose if I was truly paranoid I could add encryption as a SECOND level of defence after the first level of MAC address filtering, but quite frankly it is overkill and creates more problems that it is worth.

Wi-fi security.
Thu Jul 03 05:08:32 -0700 2008
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MAC addresses can be trivially forged. It's a one-line command to do so.

There are multiple sorts of security, access restriction is what you are talking about. Some form of shared secret is necessary to restrict a network where anyone can forge a packet. You can restrict access on an open network using a zero-knowledge proof, and still leave the traffic unencrypted. But you end up having to do the proof in every packet. It was easier to just encrypt all traffic, and the user probably does want some sort of eavesdropping protection.

The best way to do wireless, IMO, is to make it a separate local network from your hard-wired machines, gatewayed to Internet but not gatewayed into the wired LAN. Then, provide a VPN-enabled router on the wired LAN, so that you can VPN in from the wireless network. This requires three routers, but routers are cheap and many wireless access points incorporate one.

One router handles your cable or DSL connection and creates net 1. The wired network is net 2, and gateways to net 1, the wireless network is net 3 and gateways to net 1. Net 2 firewalls itself as if it's connected directly to the Internet, but accepts VPN connections. Net 3 blocks port 25 access so that spammers don't camp outside your home.

GNOME has integrated VPN access, at least for OpenVPN, into its network management applet. I don't know how this works on Windows.

Wi-fi security.
Thu Jul 03 13:52:02 -0700 2008
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GNOME has integrated VPN access, at least for OpenVPN, into its network management applet. I don't know how this works on Windows.

One thing I noticed is that winders can't see a local networked printer if connected over VPN. I was trying to figure out why my Mom's printer wasn't working one day, all sorts of printers were showing up but not hers, and as soon as the VPN session was killed...there she be. Being her work laptop I didn't even look at it so maybe just a checkbox or something.

I would think that you could incorporate all that functionality into one wireless router with extra little features like redirect all wifi web traffic that doesn't have a valid ssh session running to the St. Obama home page. Add in a virtual bridge between the localnet and wifi net that drops all but VPN traffic and you're peachy.

Learn a lot from looking over the openBSD FAQ every once in a while.

Wi-fi security.
Thu Jul 03 17:24:57 -0700 2008
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You can fix that with some static routes to cover your local subnet.

The VPN will assign you a second IP, but the first is still there.  It'll also assign new DNS and default gateway.  If you have a static route to cover your original subnet, you can still get to local resources like the printer.

i.e. -- If your non-VPN IP is 192.168.1.5/24 with a gateway of .1, then you need a route specifying 192.168.1.0/25 via .1  That way it'll persist when the VPN assigns new defaults and you can print away.

Wi-fi security.
Thu Jul 03 05:17:57 -0700 2008
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Wait a minute here: I never tried that, but the MAC address _can_ be changed on a lot of wired ethernet card, so why not on wireless card as well ?

If so, then hacking your setup is easy:

  • sniff for legitimate mac address
  • wait for one of the machine (typically a laptop) to go offline
  • profit...

That's why my home network use WEP _and_ MAC address filtering, as a first pest deterrent, but the security is host-based. Because security should of course rely on layers, one-armor fits-all is another design error.

Now, of course, if you are 100% sure that there is no way to change a WIFI card MAC address, then you and I are safe (wanna bet ? ;)

Wi-fi security.
Thu Jul 03 08:09:34 -0700 2008
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eh, of COURSE a mac address can be changed, the spec demands it! with some protocols, such as DECnet, the mac address is changed to encode the node's assigned address.

And WEP isn't secure at all, trivially cracked with any number of free wares out there.

Wi-fi security.
Thu Jul 03 16:45:47 -0700 2008
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  • sniff for legitimate mac address
  • wait for one of the machine (typically a laptop) to go offline
  • profit...

Sounds like a tarball I have sitting around somewhere to bypass the bandwidth caps on ISP accounts. Called multispoof but looks to be busted now.

Never got to try it out.

Wi-fi security.
Thu Jul 03 05:40:17 -0700 2008
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I'll put my network with an openly broadcast SSID, and WPA-2 encryption up against your non-encrypted but MAC address filtered network and see which one gets pwned first.

For all intents and purposes, WPA-2 encryption on a wireless network is more encryption than anyone really needs (so, by that metric, it's just the right amount). If someone can crack the encryption, simple MAC address filtering is merely an annoyance to be overcome, not anything remotely resembling a serious obstacle. As my AirPort Base Stations requires a reboot to change the MAC address list (grr) I simply don't use it - likewise, I don't bother hiding my network name.

Setting up a wlan on Apple equipment is as easy as it could be, and by default the highest level of encryption is used.

Encryption is the answer to wireless security. If you can't see what's going on over the wlan, you can't participate on it. Restricting the access to particular devices, where the identity of that device is trivial to impersonate is no security at all, unless it's used in conjunction with encryption.

Wi-fi security.
Thu Jul 03 07:15:41 -0700 2008
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"What Kai said."

Guy, nowadays there really is no security any longer in using WEP. It's not exactly "wired equivalent privacy" as it's much weaker than WPA(2); especially for stationary networks (like homes and offices) snooping is trivial. You really should consider upgrading your network (even at the price of a more capable router).

For the record, I use a single wlan router between the Internet and my lan, I plainly broadcast the SSID, and use WPA2-PSK encryption. I do also filter on the MAC address level, but I am aware that it's just a matter of form. I see a steady level of port scanning going on, but have not seen any evidence of break-ins (yet).

BTW, and OT: My router is running DD-WRT, but I've just found out that Tomato does some things nicer. Does anyone have experience with DD-WRT vs. Tomato?

Tomato

Thu Jul 03 12:11:09 -0700 2008
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Yes, I have experience with both, make the jump, you wont regret it. Tomato is better by every metric I can think of, uptime, memory usage, graphs, asthetics, interface, and especialy quality of service. which works infinitely better on tomato.

Tomato
Thu Jul 03 13:35:38 -0700 2008
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Tomato only runs on a small handful of routers, which is the main drawback.

Wi-fi security.
Thu Jul 03 05:57:10 -0700 2008
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I did a little research about wifi security when i bought my first wifi router.

It turned out that MAC adress filtering, SSID hiding and WEP are totally useless as they could all be found in a matter of seconds.

WPA encryption is already better... eventhough a friend of mine told me he could crack most of them in about 10min, using the tools provided on the Backtrack livecd and an Eeepc.

It seems the only more or less reliable security scheme with wifi is to use a separate RADIUS server combined with the WPA encryption, but that's a bit overkill for a home network.

Wi-fi security.
Thu Jul 03 06:40:33 -0700 2008
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WPA encryption is already better... eventhough a friend of mine told me he could crack most of them in about 10min, using the tools provided on the Backtrack livecd and an Eeepc.

Your friend is exaggerating.  The only way known to crack WPA at the moment is brute force.  Here is a detailed example.  You can shortcut a few things with pre-computing but the end result is, if you use a password of moderate complexity and the recommended length (20-63 characters), you're secure.

The tool on Backtrack he is referring to is probably coWPAtty.

Wi-fi security.
Thu Jul 03 07:01:13 -0700 2008
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Where I work we have weekly technology presentations... mostly it's very detailed work related stuff but occasionally we do have something that is not work related.  Mostly it's students doing their diploma work.  Last year we had a kid teach us all about setting up wireless networks and about wireless security.  During this demonstration he broke every security method available on some cheap router using a laptop.  The shortest times were virtually instantaneous, the longest was finished in the time it took me to walk down the hall,  make a cup of coffee, and return.  He also said he could do it using my PDA but it would take longer.

If anyone over the age of about 5 told me they could break into the wireless security available on consumer level routers in 10 minutes, I think I'd believe them.

Wi-fi security.
Thu Jul 03 07:33:31 -0700 2008
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You can download 4+ Gb of precomputed hashes for a few hundred thousand passwords for coWPAtty to greatly speed things up.

I can crack WPA, depending on the password chosen.  Poor passwords are the bane of any system.  But I haven't seen any hints of anyone cracking a properly set-up WPA system with "good" passwords.  Nor have I heard whispers of a flaw in the crypto algorithms or any vendor's implementation.

WEP is trivial.  And setting up the demonstration you talk about is also trivial -- assuming you use either short or dictionary-based passwords.

Wi-fi security.
Thu Jul 03 07:52:15 -0700 2008
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depending on the password chosen

I have "WPA/AES" with a 63 character random password generated by the "pwsafe" Linux port of Bruce Schneier's "passwordsafe" program.  I was under the impression that all of the precomputed hashes were based on dictionary words.  I was also under the impression that WPA was practically uncrackable for random passwords above about 20 characters.  There are some weaknesses to TKIP, but I thought using WPA/AES uses CCMP instead of TKIP, closing that hole.

When I say "WPA/AES" this is on a Linksys WRT54G V3.  (The Linux-capable one, though I'm still running Linksys software.)  I did some reading that indicated that that setting got me away from the somewhat-weak TKIP.

The WRT54G (affectionately referred to as "Warthog") has had its settings tweaked to act as a pure access point, dhcp server turned off, etc, and my LAN is hooked into one of its 4 LAN-side ports.

It spends most of its time with ultimate security - unplugged.  When I bring the laptop home from work, and will want to work wirelessly, I plug it in.

As other have said, MAC filtering and SSID hiding don't really do much.  But it's interesting as still others have said, it adds a level of plausible deniability to the security.  There is no accidental connecting, in this case.

Wi-fi security.
Thu Jul 03 08:02:28 -0700 2008
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Pre-computed hashes are dependent on the SSID, so just about all of the ones you can grab online are for things like "linksys", "netgear" and "dlink".  If you have a non-default SSID, then someone would have to precompute their own hashes.

For all intents and purposes, if you're using 20+ characters as a WPA-2/PSK under AES passphrase, you're covered.  If anyone could crack that it would have to pretty much be an implementation flaw in a specific router/firmware and it would be shouted from the rooftops at BlackHat, DefCon or ShmooCon.

I just acquired a Linksys WRT600N.

Wi-fi security.
Thu Jul 03 08:03:06 -0700 2008
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Is WEP down to only a few minutes now?  Last time I cracked a WEP I had to sniff about 10 million packets to get enough weak IVs to crack it.  Took about 12 hours of unrealistically high traffic (simulated) to get that amount of packets.

Wi-fi security.
Thu Jul 03 13:38:17 -0700 2008
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The tools are getting better.  And it depends on the traffic level of the router, obviously.

If you're trying to break your neighbor's router and he just checks e-mail twice a day, you could be in for a long wait.

If you're wanting to hack in to a Starbucks link or somewhere popular, it goes much quicker.

Wi-fi security.
Thu Jul 03 06:32:48 -0700 2008
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Security is "none", but the Firewall tab on the internal web server I have MAC address filtering enabled, with the MAC address of every one of the above machines enabled.

I assume you know it is quite easy to sniff and then spoof a MAC address. MAC filtering will stop casual leeching, but not anyone who is actually trying to crack your network.

Eg: Airtraf for sniffing, SMAC for spoofing.

Wi-fi security.
Thu Jul 03 07:22:15 -0700 2008
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I assume you know it is quite easy to sniff and then spoof a MAC address. MAC filtering will stop casual leeching, but not anyone who is actually trying to crack your network.

Oh, agreed, the Belkin itself has a "feature" built in that allows it to spoof the MAC address of the PC originally connected to the cable modem.

But you are the first one to make the salient point and differentiate between the casual leecher (wireless zero config machines) and the determined cracker.

This is the important point, good security is easy security, and easy security doesn't consist of a hammer that sees everything as a nail.

Hacking together a webcam to whack onto the wi-fi network as a low power device doesn't require any encryption, it doesn't benefit the functionality in any way, this is just one trivial example.

I also take Bruce's point that splitting networks into in effect a DMZ and a prive area works, but again I don't like it, why not just work with the one network, it is simpler and more elegant.

Others claim it will be easy to hack into my network, but again, the way it is configured you won't get any DNS queries answered unless you know what you're doing, and if you know what you're doing you won't be wasting your time trying to get into my virtual internet.

Plus, accessing a network doesn't give heirarchical access to every device on that network, so the mp3 jukebox is deliberately easy to access, but the RAQ is a lot harder.

President4242 gets it, without giving away precisely how my network is set up, the definition of a real honeypot is something that gives no data and no indication that there are one or more devices that you don't know about, in addition to the ones you do.

Wi-fi cards do not need to be any more "intelligent" than an cat5 ethernet adapter, cat5 cables are just as much an antennae as a wifi antenna after all, and these devices are sold as HOME wi-fi APs, not ISP ones.

The whole none / WEP / WPA thing is a solution to a problem created by the way home AP's are designed, MAC spoofing might be straightforwards, MAC spoofing won't help with Radius sessions, etc, and all these lego bricks were already out there, there was no need to create new ways of doing old jobs.

WPA renders perfectly functional older hardware as obsolete, and yet the very same people who lambast winders and praise the fact that their obsolete computer will quite happily run linux, will quite happily accept throwing away networking hardware.

WPA is also a pain in the ass if, for whatever reason, I decide to change the key, perhaps I detect a failed intrusion and realise my key is not complex enough.

WPA does not degrade, you are either in or out, and quite frankly it is stupid to force a webcam on the network to behave as though it is the machine with all my financial records on it.

WPA is not immune to any physical attack, unattended access to a box, particularly something low tech like a webcam, gives me the keys to the entire network, so it makes every single device a keystone.

Windows has been (quite rightly) lambasted for its crap file permissions system, the lack of owner / group / public limits people to "just enable file sharing" in windows wizards, or leaving it off.

This is the same binary response that wi-fi "security" currently offers, if windows gets lamnasted for it being crap then unless we are all hypocrites so should wi-fi, because it is equally crap.

The actual justification of this original article is the responses so far, most of them amounted to WPA is teh roxxor, and nobody analysed the implications that usage of WPA forces upon the users.

WPA changes, utterly, the fundamental ways in which networks were designed, par for the course for anything with Microsoft and other IP and DRM advocates as sponsors and members.... http://www.wi-fi.org/our_members.php

Wi-fi security.
Thu Jul 03 06:38:29 -0700 2008
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My method is honeypots.

I have 4 wireless routers in the same house.  2 of these are simple WPA encrypted, one for each laptop, both on channels other than 6.  The other two are wide open, non-encrypted, but everything other than port 80 shut down, filtered out both ways, as in not open even to https: browsing.

One of those is a T-Mobile hotspot that includes port 80 phone calls- so my wife's phone is free when she's in the house.  The other is a www.personaltelco.net node, which I hope eventually to attach a dish to, in order to provide some small level of browsing capability at the park across the street to the neighborhood.

Since the T-Mobile and Personal Telco hotspots are so easy to get into, I've never even recorded a bad attempt to get into the other two routers.

Wi-fi security.
Thu Jul 03 07:09:35 -0700 2008
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In today's climate, part of "security" means "legally cover my butt".  I use an SSID of "private_keep_out" and don't broadcast it.  There is absolutely no way anyone is going to claim their PC automatically connected to my network.

There are also another half-dozen b/g networks in range of my house that are softer targets.

I just switched to 802.11n for wireless, using ndiswrapper for the drivers under Linux until someone gets real drivers written.  The router is supported by DD-WRT, so I'm going to try that this weekend.

Right now I use WPA2-PSK, with a 45 character key.  I have two printers, one laser and one label (USB), a server, VoIP phone and TiVo connected via wire.  There are 4 PCs connected via wireless.

I do have MAC filtering turned on, just to weed out the amatuers, and have assigned static IPs.  DHCP is off.  I also have the router set to "N-only" mode, which means it won't accept A, B or G connections.  Just for entertainment value, the router syslogs everything to the server.

Wi-fi security.
Fri Jul 04 05:07:59 -0700 2008
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Our research showed that the default settings for wireless APs play a crucial role.  We found for consumer wireless access points (APs), such as Linksys, an encryption usage of 23% overall.  In contrast, 2Wire had an encryption usage of 96% (2008). The explanation for this difference is largely due to 2Wire has a default setting for encryption turned on.  Most APs have defaults for security set to off to save money in support costs.  The paper can be found at:  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=964950